This chapter argues that a discourse of "control," authored by the overlapping narratives of academic proliferation studies and US anti-proliferation policy, has come to dominate our understanding of nuclear histories. This discourse, with its primary purpose of seeking to predict which countries are likely to build nuclear weapons and thereby to threaten the prevailing military-strategic status quo, has narrowed the gaze of nuclear historians. Among its effects has been to minimize the importance of the discovery of atomic fission as a "world historical" event and to impoverish our recognition of the fluidity of international affairs in the decade following the end of the Second World War.
Fifty years later, these two themes -control and use -are still very much with us, marking an ongoing and widespread concern with the ends of nuclear programs. What is surprising, however, is how little agreement there is on a foundational question we might have thought would precede a discussion of ends, i.e., why states develop nuclear weapons in the first place.
Political scientist Scott Sagan offers us the most comprehensive statement on why states "go" nuclear. 6 Sagan posits that there are three primary models explaining nuclear acquisition: a "security' or realist model, which argues that states build weapons for security, and because others do; a "domestic politics" model, which sees nuclear weapons development as the outcome of actions by powerful coalitions within states that seek institutional power via this end; and, finally, a "norms" model, which argues that "weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of the state's modernity and identity." 7 The article argues in This is an important finding, but may leave other scholars of nuclear affairs a little puzzled about its significance. Scholars of foreign policy, national security strategy and international relations have long identified the moment states "go" nuclear, a technopolitical event involving the planned (and hopefully controlled) explosive release of nuclear energy, as a moment of the greatest importance. Whether called a "bomb", "test", "peaceful nuclear explosion" or "demonstration", this event is of primary significance in setting analytic calendars in these fields as it is seen to mark the unambiguous moment when a country has crossed over a particular set of political and technological boundaries. The nuclear explosion is taken to mark a shift in the international distribution of power, leading to new scales of international threat, and casting into question existing regimes of nuclear control. It is easy to see why, for realist analysts of foreign policy and for governmental policy makers, this event matters.
But is trying to understand why countries conduct their first nuclear test the same as explaining why countries begin nuclear programs? By identifying the nuclear test as the moment when a threshold has been crossed -the historic moment -analysts have effectively reduced the variety of histories of any nuclear program to the path that led to this particular outcome. The multiple meanings of nuclear power are shrunk into one 6 6 register -the desire to produce weapons -an analytic shortcoming with both real world and conceptual implications. From a practical standpoint, it highlights the prevailing bias that countries that seek to develop nuclear weapons are of special interest to scholars, thereby conflating scholarly interests with those of policy makers who necessarily have to be worried about new weapons, and, reinforces the particular aura of nuclear weapons as objects to be coveted and desired, the very opposite effect sought by policy makers concerned with nuclear proliferation.
The intent of this chapter is to explore, first, how the language of nuclear "control" 9 has helped narrow our analytic vision. Due to the substantial overlap of two streams of analysis 10 --academic proliferation studies and US proliferation practice, policy measures seeking to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide --a discourse of "control" has come to dominate our understanding of nuclear issues. By examining two key concepts in nuclear proliferation studies, we come to realize how a singular focus on a techno-political event, the nuclear explosion, distorts our 9 Using "control" rather than the more common "proliferation" reflects our understanding of proliferation as "political language." "Proliferation" indexes an international-legal discourse where five countries are given a special status as "nuclear weapon states," and where the intent of the law is to prevent other states from acquiring the same de jure understanding of the course of nuclear programs; an alternative approach is suggested.
Second, in order to set the study of nuclear histories on a more productive path, this approach draws on a concept derived from colonial discourse studies -ambivalence -to
show that there are remarkable and largely unacknowledged similarities between all the "early" nuclear states. Finally, this chapter argues that nuclear programs are best understood as one of a larger family of public technology projects, not all of which are weapons-related or have destructive ends. The larger point here is to propose that without a careful appreciation of the political and historical context within which decisions are made to develop nuclear programs, it is not possible to get closer to understanding the desire for, likelihood of potential use and possibility of international control of nuclear weapons.
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Opacity, Ambiguity and India's "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion"
The centrality and, by extension, the limits of the first nuclear test in analytically determining the "true" course of a country's nuclear program is best appreciated by considering two concepts central to proliferation studies, i.e., "ambiguity" and "opacity."
India tested a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) in 1974. The PNE was officially 11 For examples of the mistaken conclusions that an uncritical use of "proliferation" discourse leads to especially when starting from systemic-structural assumptions, see India had tested, based on the experience of every other country that had conducted a nuclear test since 1945, it could be considered a nuclear power. But was it? India "did nothing" for the next 24 years, or, in other words, didn't test again or overtly weaponize until 1998. This "expected absence" came to be called a state of nuclear "ambiguity."
Nuclear "ambiguity" is usually defined as uncertainty in the presence of suspicion about the existence of a nuclear weapons program. But as Frankel and Cohen point out, the term nuclear ambiguity "is [itself] ambiguous": it could either mean a lack of clarity on the part of others' knowledge of the extent and abilities of a country's nuclear program -do they have a weapons program or not? -or could mean a multiplicity of views on the part of a country's leadership about the utility, efficacy and morality of nuclear weapons possession. 13 The conceptual weakness of this term is clear when we realize that when taken to the limit, all nuclear-capable countries could be said to be in a state of ambiguity until they explode a nuclear device. Ambiguity, however, is to be distinguished from "opacity."
12 That a techno-political event is only a "demonstration" is an official hedge. It should be taken to mean a technical capability to do something which (a) stops short of defining national policy, and, (b) provides cover to the technologists in case of failure. Central to the meaning of the word are the various audiences -domestic and foreign -who are presumed to be seeking unambiguous meaning from this event.
13 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," in Opaque Avner Cohen defines opacity as a "situation in which the existence of a state's nuclear weapons has not been acknowledged by the state's leaders, but in which the evidence for the weapons' existence is strong enough to influence other nations' perceptions and actions." 14 The best example of this case is Israel, which has not officially declared its possession of nuclear weapons, but has institutionalized opacity at the highest level of national strategy. Ambiguity, in other words, is about uncertainty and lack of knowledge for the outsider; by this definition, so is opacity, but here the uncertainty is "actionable" from a policy point of view.
Opacity can be understood as the outcome of (a) indecision at the highest levels of political decision-making (e.g., India), (b) a deliberate strategy of information denial (e.g., Israel), (c) an effort to finesse executive authority via calculated deception by a government agency or coalition of agencies (e.g., Fourth Republic France). Nuclear opacity on both sides of a dyadic rivalry might even lead to an equilibrium state of mutual tacit (nuclear) deterrence (e.g., India and Pakistan from the late-1980s). We realize that the only possible resolutions to this uncertainty are a nuclear explosion or the public dismantling of the program, à la South Africa. Given the small likelihood of the latter, ambiguity and opacity become threshold terms describing a liminal stage between intention and a yet-to-happen event, the long moment between the Fall and the Second
Coming. In the case of nuclear ambiguity, a nuclear test is taken to mean that the technical means to do so has been converted into formal ability -whether expected by analysts or not; in the case of opacity, a test is taken to show that the decision has been made to "come out of the nuclear closet" and openly declare a nuclear power. Given but, by the same token, once a test has taken place ambiguity and opacity are no longer meaningful categories.
The narrowing of vision embodied in these terms, built around the expectation that an explosion is forthcoming, reinforces the idea of how limited the purposes and meaning of a nuclear program are assumed to be, and how devalued is the importance of the political processes that ultimately make these decisions. Yet, if it is important to establish when a country has decided to develop nuclear weapons, the moment of a nuclear explosion is convenient but may not necessarily be meaningful. If the counter example of Israel -a country that is recognized to have a nuclear weapons program but which has never openly tested a nuclear device --is not sufficient, and we seek to establish whether a country has a "real" nuclear weapons program or not, an alternative approach might be based on a closer examination of the technical means to nuclear explosive potential. However, under this scheme the evidence of a single test is neither necessary nor sufficient.
It is not unreasonable to think of the first nuclear test explosion as still a scientific experiment. Although the feasibility of the fission process has been known for more than half a century, setting off a first explosive device anywhere is still an act of scientific ability, combined with considerable engineering skills, involving trial and error, chance and luck. And not inconsiderable means. To successfully produce a single nuclear explosive device requires, at the minimum, the following expertise: mathematical and statistical modeling skills, sufficient fissile material, sophisticated materials handling 11 11 abilities, expertise in conventional explosives, electronics and instrumentation abilities, the organizational skills to bring all these different elements together effectively, adequate finances, and a place to do it.
However, for this first test to translate into a weapons program and a nuclear arsenal that can be used at will, two things must happen. First and foremost, a political decision has to be taken to go ahead, and second, ad hoc scientific procedures have to be replaced with an organized, ends-oriented technological process. The technologization of the nuclear explosive building process is a discrete step necessary to convert a latent scientific ability to make nuclear explosives into a tangible and reliable process. Every step of the process -fissile material extraction, weapon design and testing, and delivery --has to be converted into an industrial process, built around repetition, with uncertainty minimized, where scientific practices are converted into industrial routines and safety codes, where internal security practices are regularized and institutionalized. It may not always be possible for the same organization that produced the first explosive device as a one-off scientific event to industrialize the process. Certainly new forms of industrial and organizational management have to be employed and the process routinized sufficiently to reduce levels of error to a level where the explosive device meets the standards of military reliability. In other words, if you want to build a reliable nuclear weapons program, a number of tangible, material, organizational objectives have to be put into place, and these can be observed.
How do these clarifications help us better understand India's nuclear history?
Volumes have been written about the 1998 tests, seeking above all to explain why India 12 12 did what it did, when it did. 15 To many, the still unresolved question is why, following the 1974 PNE, India did "nothing" until 1998, when it set off five more explosions and announced itself a nuclear power. But of course India didn't "do nothing" for 24 years, under five different prime ministers a very high level and public debate went on for a generation about the larger purpose of the country's nuclear program, the costs of nuclear power versus other sources of energy, the threat to the world from nuclear weapons, the likelihood of global and limited disarmament, the significance and implications of the Non-Proliferation and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties, and, finally, whether or not to build a nuclear weapons arsenal. 16 In 1998, a newly elected government, operating in great secrecy, and, as in 1974, ahead of a political consensus that this was necessary for India's security, decided India should "go" nuclear. But, it should be noted, this decision was by no means pre-determined, nor are 1974 nor 1998 necessarily the relevant dates best reflecting the changed status of India's nuclear capabilities.
Based on the technological criteria referred to above, India probably became a nuclear "power" around 1986, when Rajiv Gandhi was prime minister. 17 From this point onward, India was certainly capable of using nuclear weapons in war, and could be Considerable evidence now exists that there were at least two attempts to test before 1998, though these were stymied by internal political disagreements and US pressure.
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Certainly India's nuclear scientific establishment had been keen to push ahead with more tests for some time, but the political leadership had not made up their minds about the value of doing so. It was not until the ascent to power of the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a radically new political dispensation in government, that the political decision to "out" India's capabilities was taken, well after conditions on the ground existed. While the decision to test again was the outcome of particular political changes, the siren song of a nationalist government finally in power, for all practical purposes India was already a nuclear power. Minister Narasimha Rao ordered a series of tests which were cancelled following internal disagreements and US pressure. Of his two successors, Atal Behari Vajpayee also ordered tests but his government fell in 13 days, while H. D. Deve Gowda felt that other matters were more pressing than nuclear tests, even though the test site was ready and explosives were in place. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 375-6. 14 14 significant as it sought to signal identity with dominant international norms of nuclear meaning.
In other words, we argue that framing the decision behind the May 1998 tests was the desire to reduce the multiple meanings of a "peaceful" nuclear program, to force nuclear ambivalence into a more familiar register. The desire to discipline these excesses of meaning -via nuclear explosions --comes from the intersection of the discourse of control with that of the domestic nuclear scientist seeking "sweet" solutions, more 
Nuclear Ambivalence
However, even once a state has "gone" nuclear, seemingly setting to rest doubts whether it is a proliferator or not, the meaning of what has emerged continues to be unstable. Are these weapons for deterrence, for war-fighting, for arms control; do they work? Earlier meanings of the nuclear revolution -atoms for peace and for electricitydo not disappear but can even gather new force. In what follows, we see the expression of ambivalence in more than one setting, seemingly in contradictory fashion, but only if we consider the expression of polysemic forms a violation of our preferred epistemology. Scholarly interest in weapons production is usually located within a conceptual framework that isolates the nuclear industry from the larger political economy of the state, occluding the family resemblances of a class of modern technologies both destructive and non-destructive, and that prevents us from appreciating the flow of ideas, rules, procedures, and techniques between the nuclear industry and the rest of the state apparatus. 19 This tendency to isolate individual states and to examine their unique motives for going nuclear prevents us from giving due importance to the varieties of international collaboration that were common and indispensable to all early developers of nuclear programs (and, which by extension, gives us another history of nuclearism).
Focusing on the reasons behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons reduces the number of cases that might be part of our analytic universe by focusing primarily on the bomb makers and reduces the search for the multiple factors that influence why countries develop nuclear programs by narrowing analytic gaze to the causes underlying weapons acquisition. 20 Put these together and it can be appreciated why there is still little 19 One example of these flows is the adoption of highly restrictive procedures originally agreement on the far more vexing question of why countries which could "go" nuclear don't, or, as suggested below, appear not to.
Rather than forcing the analysis down one or another path exclusively, I prefer to use the term "ambivalence" to discuss the nuclear condition, in order to highlight the simultaneous presence of more than one meaning of nuclear practices, whether during the "stage" of ambiguity, before or after. Ambivalence is a permanent feature of the nuclear sign, and not simply a question of narrow political choice. This semantic excess is not a sign of conceptual weakness, but recognition of the inability to wholly control the meaning of nuclear events. As the post-colonial cultural critic Homi K. Bhabha puts it (in the context of colonial discourse), the production of ambivalence does not emerge from "the contestation of contradictories [or] the antagonism of dialectical opposition."
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Ambivalence is rather a "splitting" of discourse, a denial of the possibility of either one or the other side of familiar binaries (e.g., security/insecurity, war/peace), resulting in "multiple and contradictory belief"; splitting is a "strategy for articulating contradictory and co-eval statements of belief." 22 The "strategy" of ambivalence, as Bhabha uses it, is not an instrument of policy under the control of the proliferating state, to be used to deceive or confuse, but rather an effect of the inability of discourse to fix itself unambiguously on one or another nuclear meaning. "Splitting" the discourse of nuclear showing that both war and peace are always present in the meanings attributed to nuclear programs, the discussion opens up nuclear history to explore its intimate relation with the state project of legitimacy in the modern era.
Origins
One of the most enduring tropes of nuclear histories is the idea that atomic energy programs are always national programs. The close relation between nuclear power and national power has led to the assumption that, for reasons of security especially, nuclear programs must be uniquely identified with particular countries. Official histories and scientists encourage this belief, for obvious parochial reasons, but it is rarely true. No atomic program anywhere in the world has ever been purely indigenous, nor is it sensible to attribute singular national origins to the scientific efforts to create nuclear fission in laboratories. Given the continental scale of nuclear physics research in pre-war years, where scientists from a dozen countries worked together in four or five different countries, it is difficult, and indeed intellectually pointless, to attribute either origins or 23 Another amazing parallel across practically all national narratives of nuclear energy (not developed here) is the figure of the "Father of the [put country name here] Nuclear
Program" --a male scientist-bureaucrat-politician who is able to achieve great success in all three domains. given the overwhelming concern with security, one might have expected to be the most privileged and restricted -in a word, nationalized -the Indian atomic energy project was from the outset built in collaboration with multiple foreign partners.
Ends
Those responsible for the Indian nuclear program had long been aware of the possibility of atomic energy being used to build weapons. In yet another example of the intertwined histories of nuclearization across many sites, we find that both Indian and no surprise, the two lists were almost exactly the same.
The near-simultaneous realization by Flerov and Bhabha (and undoubtedly others) that the US was engaged in a highly secret process to build an atomic weapon should come as no surprise. The potential military implications of these discoveries was also no secret to any one who had a basic understanding of the fission process, though there was less than unanimity on the exact outcome of a process of nuclear fission. 38 The nuclear physics community in the inter-war years was small, close-knit, and multinational. New discoveries were emerging from a relatively small numbers of labs in Nehru's ambivalence, expressed through the simultaneous demands for international control over nuclear weapons and domestic sovereignty over India's nuclear development, would be resolved by a discursive shift in the meaning of nuclear energy, aligning it not with destruction but the history of technology and India's colonial past. The closest parallel to the Indian program with regard to the larger national- 
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that a discourse of "control," authored by the overlapping narratives of academic proliferation studies and US anti-proliferation policy, has come to dominate contemporary understandings of nuclear histories. This discourse, with its primary purpose of seeking to predict which countries are likely to build nuclear weapons and thereby to threaten the prevailing military-strategic status quo, has narrowed the Returning now to a question that has not received a complete answer: why don't all countries that could build nuclear weapons, do so? The answer: they only appear not to.
The discussion above elaborated the multiplicity of meanings encompassed by the nuclear sign, meanings that might be in contradiction with each other, but that continue to be available to different audiences at the same time. to outside observers and in relation to the prevailing discourse about nuclear programs, it was worth the immediate and corresponding decline in the country's net security.
Nuclear explosions may not tell us whether a country is developing a nuclear weapons program or not, but it does signal a desired dialogue with dominant discourses.
If nuclear programs carry this ideological weight, at the same time as they may (or may not) be a means to produce weapons, then a policy that seeks to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons -counter-proliferation -must take that "fact" seriously. If reasons of national sovereignty and the desire to make a unique claim to modernity help us understand why Malaysia builds the Petronas Towers, why Taiwan and China follow suit with even taller buildings, why Japan has a space program, why Ghana, Indonesia Sydney's Opera House is much more than a building to see Tosca, then we can see why getting rid of a nuclear program is extremely difficult.
In the 1950s and 1960s, when the discourse of control was far less determinate What countries are giving up, especially democratic ones, when they dismantle their nuclear programs is a claim to a form of national modernity that they once took pride in and for granted. Little wonder that nuclear "control" is so difficult, especially when the unevenness of the demand to dismantle is as visible as it is today. If there needed to be another reason given of why the process of global disarmament needs to begin from the top -from those who have the most weapons -it is also because the country with the greatest access to the highest forms of modernity is also the best starting
